WITTGENSTEIN'S PROBLEM OF RULE-FOLLOWING AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY STUDIES
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WITTGENSTEIN'S PROBLEM OF RULE-FOLLOWING AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY STUDIES
Annotation
PII
S1811-833X0000617-8-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Pages
34-39
Abstract
The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book “The Idea of Social Science” (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.
Keywords
rule-following, legal language, legal rule, analytical legal philosophy
Date of publication
01.09.2020
Number of purchasers
11
Views
364
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0.0 (0 votes)
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References



Additional sources and materials

  1. Araszkiewicz, et al. (eds.) Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following. Dordrecht: Springer, 2015, 455 pp.
  2. Bix, B. “The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein’s RuleFollowing Considerations to Legal Theory”, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 1990, vol. III, no. 2, pp. 107‒121.
  3. Bix, B. Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 221 pp.
  4. Wittgenstein, L. Filosofskie raboty [The Philosophical Works]. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, 612 pp. (In Russian)
  5. Didikin, A.B. “Sledovanie pravilu i juridicheskij jazyk: argumenty realizma i antirealizma” [Rule Following and Legal Language: Realism and Antirealism Arguments], Izvestija Ural’skogo federal’nogo universiteta. Serija 3: Obshhestvennye nauki – Izvestia. Ural Federal University Journal. Series 3. Social and Political Sciences, 2015, no. 4 (164), pp. 66‒72. (In Russian)
  6. Didikin, A.B. “Interpretacija problemy sledovanija pravilu v analiticheskoj filosofii prava” [The Interpretation of Rule Following in Analytical Legal Philosophy], Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofija. Sociologija. Politologija – Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science, 2015, no. 2 (30), pp. 83‒88. (In Russian)
  7. Hart, G.L.A.; E.V. Afonasin, S.V. Moiseev (trans.). Ponjatie prava [The Concept of Law]. Saint Petersberg: Izd-vo S.-Pb. Un-ta, 2007, 302 pp. (In Russian)
  8. Kasatkin, S.N. “Problema sledovanija pravilu: Hart i Vitgenshtejn” [Problem of Rule-Following: Hart and Wittgenstein], in: S.V. Nikonenko (ed.). L. Vitgenshtejn: pro et contra, antologija [Wittgenstein: Pro et Contra, Antology]. Saint Petersburg: RHGA, 2019, pp. 1006‒1018. (In Russian)
  9. Kripke, S.; V.A. Ladov, V.A. Surovcev (trans.). Vitgenshtejn o pravilah i individual’nom jazyke [Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language]. Moscow: Kanon+ ROOI «Reabilitacija», 2010, 256 pp. (In Russian)
  10. Ogleznev, V.V., Surovcev, V.A. “Analiticheskaja filosofija prava G. Harta i pravovoj realizm” [H. Hart’s Analytical Legal Philosophy and Legal Realism], Izvestija Vysshih uchebnyh zavedenij. Pravovedenie, 2013, no. 5 (322), pp. 134‒147. (In Russian)
  11. Patterson, D. (ed.) Wittgenstein and Law. London: Routledge, 2004, 496 pp.
  12. Rodin, K.A. “Problema sledovanija pravilu i mesto Vitgenshtejna v sociologicheskih issledovanijah: vozvrashhenie k Piteru Uinchu” [The Problem of RuleFollowing and Wittgenstein’s Place in Sociology Studies: Return to Peter Winch], Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2020, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 22–33. (In Russian)
  13. Schauer, F. “Rules and the Rule-Following Argument”, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 1990, vol. III, no. 2, pp. 187‒192.

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