Array
(
    [0] => Array
        (
            [sl] => ru
            [dispatch] => products.view
            [product_id] => 63205
            [version_id] => 0
        )

    [1] => ?:products.*, ?:product_descriptions.*, MIN(IF(?:product_prices.percentage_discount = 0, ?:product_prices.price, ?:product_prices.price - (?:product_prices.price * ?:product_prices.percentage_discount)/100)) as price, GROUP_CONCAT(IF(?:products_authors.link_type = 'M', CONCAT(?:products_authors.author_id, 'M'), ?:products_authors.author_id) ORDER BY ?:products_authors.position) as authors_ids, popularity.total as popularity, ?:publications_version.status as status, ?:publications_version.version_id as version_id, IF(shared_prices.product_id IS NOT NULL,MIN(IF(shared_prices.percentage_discount = 0, shared_prices.price, shared_prices.price - (shared_prices.price * shared_prices.percentage_discount)/100)),MIN(IF(?:product_prices.percentage_discount = 0, ?:product_prices.price, ?:product_prices.price - (?:product_prices.price * ?:product_prices.percentage_discount)/100))) as price
    [2] => Array
        (
            [product_id] => 63205
            [product_code] => S1811-833X0000617-8-
            [doi] => 
            [show_doi] => N
            [product_type] => P
            [serial_number] => 617
            [company_id] => 202
            [list_price] => 1.0
            [amount] => 0
            [weight] => 0.000
            [length] => 0
            [width] => 0
            [height] => 0
            [shipping_freight] => 0.00
            [low_avail_limit] => 0
            [timestamp] => 1611929507
            [updated_timestamp] => 1611931315
            [usergroup_ids] => 0
            [is_edp] => Y
            [edp_shipping] => N
            [unlimited_download] => N
            [tracking] => B
            [free_shipping] => N
            [zero_price_action] => R
            [is_pbp] => N
            [is_op] => N
            [is_oper] => N
            [is_returnable] => Y
            [return_period] => 10
            [avail_since] => 0
            [out_of_stock_actions] => N
            [localization] => 
            [min_qty] => 0
            [max_qty] => 0
            [qty_step] => 0
            [list_qty_count] => 0
            [tax_ids] => 
            [age_verification] => N
            [age_limit] => 0
            [options_type] => P
            [exceptions_type] => F
            [details_layout] => 
            [shipping_params] => a:5:{s:16:"min_items_in_box";i:0;s:16:"max_items_in_box";i:0;s:10:"box_length";i:0;s:9:"box_width";i:0;s:10:"box_height";i:0;}
            [publication_type] => A
            [source_materials] => 
            [date_public] => 1598907600
            [date_accepted] => 0
            [date_received] => 0
            [date_included] => 0
            [date_review] => 0
            [comments] => 
            [list_ref] => <ol>
<li>Касавин И.Т. Социальная эпистемология: понятие и проблемы // Эпистемология и философия науки. 2006. Т. 7. № 1. С. 5-15.</li>
<li>Моркина Ю.С. Социальная теория познания Д. Блура: истоки и философский смысл. М.: Канон+; РООИ "Реабилитация". 256 с.</li>
<li>Мотрошилова Н.В. "Социальная эпистемология": новые проблемы, дискуссии и дихотомии // Ценности и смыслы. 2011. № 5. С. 5-31.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Explanation and Analysis in Strawson's‘Persons' // Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1970. Vol. 48. № 1. P. 2-9.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Is the Official Theory of Mind Absurd? // The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1970. Vol. 21. № 2. P. 167-183.</li>
<li>Bloor D. The dialectics of metaphor // Inquiry. 1971. Vol. 14. № 1-4. P. 430-444.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Two Paradigms for Scientific Knowledge? // Science Studies. 1971. Vol. 1. № 1. P. 101-115.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Are Philosophers Averse To Science? // Meaning And Control: Essays In Social Aspects Of Science And Technology / Ed. by D.O. Edge, J.N. Wolfe. London: Tavistock Publications, 1973, P. 1-18.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Epistemology or Psychology? The structure of scientific inference by Mary Hesse // Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 1975. Vol. 5. № 4. P. 382-395.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Polyhedra and the Abominations of Leviticus // The British Journal for the History of Science. 1978. Vol. 11. № 3. P. 245-272.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Knowledge and Social Imagery. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 203 p.</li>
<li>Bloor D. Sociology of Scientific Knowledge // Handbook of Epistemology / Ed. by I. Niiniluoto et al. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2004. P. 919-962.</li>
<li>Freudenthal G. How Strong Is Dr. Bloor's‘Strong Programme'? // Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 1979. Vol. 10. № 1. P. 67-83.</li>
<li>Fuller S. Social Epistemology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. 316 p.</li>
<li>Goldman E. Social Epistemology // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/ (дата обращения: 12.03.2020)</li>
<li>Hesse M.B. Models and analogies in science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966. 184 p.</li>
<li>Hesse M.B. Is There an Independent Observation Language? // The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy / Ed. by R G. Colodny. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971. P. 35-79.</li>
<li>Hesse M B. The Structure of Scientific Inference. University of California Press, 1974. 309 p.</li>
<li>Hesse M.B. Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1980. 271 p.</li>
<li>Manicas P.T, Rosenberg A. Naturalism, Epistemological Individualism and‘The Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Knowledge // Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 1985. Vol. 15. № 1. P. 76-101.</li>
<li>Manier E. Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the‘Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Knowledge // PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. 1980. Vol. 1: Contributed Papers. P. 197-207.</li>
<li>Restivo S. The Myth of the Kuhnian Revolution // Sociological Theory. 1983. Vol. 1. № 1. P. 293-305.</li>
<li>Sturm T., Gigerenzer G. How Can We Use The Distinction Between Discovery And Justification? On The Weaknesses Of The Strong Programme In The Sociology Of Science // Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction / Ed. by J. Schickore, F. Steinle. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. P. 133-58.</li>
<li>Zammito J. A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour. Chicago; London: University Of Chicago Press, 2004. 390 p.</li>
</ol>
            [number_payments] => 11
            [issues_id] => 0
            [product_another] => 
            [keywords_list_another] => 
            [full_description_another] => 
            [financing_sources] => 
            [financing_sources_en] => 
            [position] => 11
            [page_from] => 105
            [page_to] => 124
            [rubric_ru] => 
            [rubric_en] => 
            [external_pid] => 0
            [edu_program_ids] => 319,320
            [operator_id] => 18904
            [issn_isbn] => 1811-833X
            [pages] => 0
            [retracted] => N
            [retracted_comment] => 
            [external_url] => 
            [video_url] => 
            [gold_access] => N
            [nonperiodic_type] => 
            [isbn] => 
            [source] => 
            [fiscal_data_1212] => 1
            [mark_code_type] => 
            [lang_code] => ru
            [product] => СОЦИОЛОГИЯ ИЛИ ПСИХОЛОГИЯ? О КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНОЙ АРХИТЕКТУРЕ СИЛЬНОЙ ПРОГРАММЫ В СОЦИОЛОГИИ НАУЧНОГО ЗНАНИЯ ДЭВИДА БЛУРА
            [shortname] => 
            [short_description] => 
            [full_description] => Цель статьи - реверс-инжиниринг концептуальной архитектуры сильной программы в социологии научного знания Д. Блура через экспликацию ресурсов и способов ее построения, чтобы лучше понять ее логику и объяснительные намерения. Для этого демонстрируется проблематичность конвенциональной интерпретации сильной программы как радикализации теории науки Т. Куна и как социологизированной эпистемологии. Эта проблематизация позволяет заново поставить ряд вопросов: В каком смысле сильная программа является постпозитивистской? В каком смысле она является социологической? Является ли она эпистемологией? Для ответа на эти вопросы: 1) Локализуется позиция сильной программы в отношении спора Т. Куна и К. Поппера; 2) Дается анализ сетевой модели науки М. Хессе как базового ресурса сильной программы; 3) Рассматривается способ построения Блуром сильной программы через оригинальную интерпретацию и апроприацию сетевой модели; 4) Эксплицируется значение этой интерпретации для версии сильной программы 1976 г.
            [meta_keywords] => 
            [meta_description] => 
            [search_words] => 
            [page_title] => 
            [theme] => 
            [age_warning_message] => 
            [keywords_list] => социология научного знания, исследования науки и технологий, социальная эпистемология, Дэвид Блур, Мэри Хессе, Томас Кун, Карл Поппер, эмпиризм
            [affiliation] => 
            [address] => 
            [occupation] => 
            [additional_sources_n_materials] => 
            [promo_text] => 
            [authors] => 
            [report_name] => 
            [price] => 0.00000000
            [authors_ids] => 45926
            [popularity] => 1332
            [status] => P
            [version_id] => 62924
        )

)