The article presents a critical response to the project of the synthetic philosophy of M.N. Epstein. The author of the article partly agrees with the main intention of the project: modern philosophy should more actively perform a projective function in society, developing and justifying new types of cognitive and cultural practices. At the same time, the article emphasizes that philosophers still retain the traditional tendency to create synthetic constructions that claim to universality, whereas modern philosophy has largely got rid of such illusions of previous philosophy. The latter circumstance sets the context in which the project of synthetic philosophy proposed by M.N. Epstein, causes objections. In particular, the article shows that at an early stage of its development, analytical philosophy can indeed be regarded as the antithesis of a constructive and synthetic understanding of philosophy. But from the middle of the last century, the situation began to change, and nowadays fundamental metaphysical problems are discussed in analytical philosophy - from the nature of human consciousness to conditions of freedom and justice. In light of this, the contrast between the synthetic approach and the analytical approach seems to be unfounded. The article also discusses the nature of concepts, their difference from notions and their various interpretations in modern philosophy.